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ABSTRACT
At the seventh Conference of Parties in Marrakech (COP 7) a consensus was reached on the
rules, the modalities and the guidelines of the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol. In
this paper we assess the outlook and potential of one of the flexibility mechanisms, viz. Joint
Implementation between the European Union and Russia. We show that both parties have all the
incentives to start working on Joint Implementation and we assess the biggest obstacle for
implementing JI.
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1. INTRODUCTION/JUSTIFICATION
Ever since the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit in 1992, climate change has been
on the agenda for international policy makers. This has led to the Kyoto
Protocol, which is aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Under the
Protocol, the so-called Annex I countries can employ economic instruments
that would enable them to achieve the necessary reductions in greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions in a cost-efficient manner. These ‘‘flexibility mechanisms’’
are Joint Implementation (JI), Emissions Trading (ET), and the Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism (CDM). While ET allows countries to trade emissions
reductions, the two other mechanisms (JI and CDM) are investments in real
project abatement activities.
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10.1080/15693430512331342612$16.00# Taylor & Francis Ltd.
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
7:
57
 4
 A
pr
il
 2
01
1
Because different countries have different emissions reduction targets
under the Kyoto Protocol and the costs of achieving the necessary reductions
at home differ, there will be buyers and sellers. The utilization of these
mechanisms will inevitably lead to a market of emissions rights, or -as it is
often called- a carbon market. The dynamics of this market and the emerging
price of emissions rights will affect not only the economies of the participants
but also the achievement of any particular environmental goal.
Two major issues have shaped the international climate change agenda
since 2000. First, at the seventh Conference of Parties in Marrakech (COP 7) a
consensus was reached on major issues considering the rules, modalities and
guidelines on how the flexibility mechanisms should operate. The second
issue is the withdrawal of the USA from the Kyoto Protocol. In an economic
retrospective of the international climate change policy arena this means the
withdrawal of the biggest polluter and the biggest potential buyer of emissions
rights from the emerging market.
This leads to a new picture of emerging global climate change policy
regime where Russia and European Union are playing a leading role. The first,
Russia, is crucial for entering Protocol into force as only Russia can input
the necessary 13% of reduction needed to achieve the required 55% of GHG
emissions from 55 industrialized countries. The current share of GHG emis-
sions in the world by Russia accounts to 16.4%. The second, the EU, is the
front-runner in creation of domestic and EU wide policies, such as EU
emissions trading scheme (ETS) that are the first in world clear and significant
steps in putting Kyoto protocol implementation into reality.
In this paper we investigate what these developments could bring for the
EU-Russian partnership in climate change mitigation and more specifically
on one of the Kyoto flexibility instrument, i.e. Joint Implementation, in the
energy sector. We will start with a brief description of what JI in the energy
sector means and what place it takes in the emerging carbon market. Then we
will take a closer look at the key issues that shape the EU-Russia potential in
cooperation on JI. Existence of EU-Russia JI is directly dependent on the
Russian ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. This is the crucial point and
decision that Russia still does not clearly show it intends to make. EU is being
the strongest and the most active promoter for Russia’s ratification. The
subject discussed is still very much dependent on the policies and national
priorities on the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms that are currently not fixed, in
particular in Russia. Therefore we find it of importance to investigate and
outline the key parameters of policy choice and the weight that Russia and EU
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can put on JI in relation to all of three Kyoto Mechanisms. These decisions
will be obviously based on various factors. In this paper we will assess the
main of these factors: enabling environment for a mechanism in both, the EU
and Russia; will there be a demand from the EU Member States for JI
generated credits and will Russia be able to meet it, and finally the price
setting for JI credits.
2. JOINT IMPLEMENTATION AND ITS PLACE
IN THE EMERGING CARBON MARKET
2.1. The Kyoto Protocol and its Economic Instruments
The Kyoto Protocol (1997) is aimed at the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions and contains legally binding targets of emissions reductions for
industrialized countries. The Protocol allows these countries (the so-called
Annex I countries – Table 2) to reach their emissions targets by employing
specially designed flexibility mechanisms: Joint Implementation, Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism, Bubble concept and International Emissions Trading.
The use of these mechanisms enables countries to achieve environmental
goals in a cost-efficient manner.
While International Emissions Trading (IET) presents international trade
in GHC emission rights, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint
Implementation (JI) are direct foreign investments in GHGs emissions
reduction projects (Table 1).
According to CDM the Annex I countries may use the certified emissions
reduction (CERs) generated from project activities to contribute to the com-
pliance with part of their emissions reduction commitments. Emissions
reductions achieved under CDM projects can be counted against the Kyoto
target of an investing country. Joint Implementation (JI) allows any Annex I
country to transfer to, or acquire from, any other such party emissions
reduction units (ERUs) resulting from projects aimed at reducing greenhouse
gas emissions in these countries. International Emissions Trading enables
Annex B countries to fulfill their commitments by transferring (buying/
selling) emissions rights among themselves. Some experts interpret (Janssen,
2000) JI as a form of international production of emission permits associ-
ated with subsequent internal international transfer, as opposed to pure
international trade in emission permits through markets which would con-
stitute IET.
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Each of the mechanisms provides for an exchange of a different type,
between different sets of countries and using a different type of unit to denote
the emissions or emission reductions being exchanged. The defined rules
Table 1. The Kyoto Protocol and its Flexibility Instruments.
Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM)
Joint
Implementation
(JI)
International Emissions
Trading (IET)
Stated in F Article 12 Article 6 Article 17
Type F Foreign investments in GHG
emission reduction projects
International trade of
GHG emission credits
Who can participate F Annex I countries Annex I countries Annex Ba countries
+ +* +*
Non-Annex I countries Annex I countries Annex B countries
Starting period F Usable from 2000
onwards (banking
of emissions credits)
Usable from 2008 onwards or
earlier (to be decided)
Unit of trade/transfer F CER ERU AAU
Certified Emission
Reduction
Emission Reduction
Unit
Assigned Amount
Unit
aAnnex B is almost identical to Annex I excluding only two countries: Belarus and Turkey.
Source: Authors.
Table 2. Annex I Countries.
Australia Greece Portugal
Austria Hungarya Romaniaa
Belarusa Iceland Russian Federationa
Belgium Ireland Slovakiaa
Bulgariaa Italy Sloveniaa
Canada Japan Spain
Croatia Latviaa Sweden
Czech Republica Liechtenstein Switzerland
Denmark Lithuaniaa Turkey
European Economic Luxembourg Ukrainea
Community Monaco United Kingdom of Great
Estonia a/ Netherlands Britain and Northern Ireland
Finland New Zealand United States of America
France Norway
Germany Polanda
aCountries – Economies in Transition.
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under Marrakech agreement identify that assigned amount units (AAUs),
credits from Joint Implementation (ERUs) and Clean Development Mecha-
nism (CERs) projects and/or emissions removals from eligible sink activities,
i.e. removal units (RMUs) can be used for complying with the Kyoto targets
and each designated unit is set up as 1 ton of CO2e thus creating the common
space for transfer of units between eligible countries. In international
literature this space is referred to as emerging international carbon market.
2.2. Joint Implementation: Provisions in Marrakech Accords
and Experience in Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ)
Before moving further in investigating opportunities of EU-Russia partnership
in Joint Implementation in energy sector authors find useful to briefly
overview the key basics of the mechanism by itself as well as to provide
readers with the background information on the international experience
learned.
2.2.1. Marrakech Accords: Joint Implementation
Joint Implementation has an international nature – at least two different
countries (or entities from different countries) are involved in JI project. The
investing country is the country that funds the project and the host country is
the country in which the project is carried out. Joint Implementation is
specifically designed to achieve emissions reductions that otherwise would not
occur. As for any other project, implementation of JI project can be best
described via its project cycle. In simplified form the cycle is shown in
Figure 1. A project has to pass the following phases: identification of the
project, project design and development and project implementation.
Fig. 1. JI project cycle (simplified version). (Source: ECN, 2002; Authors.)
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In order to measure the emission reduction units, it is necessary to estimate
how high the host country’s emission level would be in the absence of the
project. Therefore, the baseline scenario on emissions should be drawn up. The
simplified calculation of ERUs eligible to be transferred is shown in Box 1. (It
must be noted that the choice of baseline is not a specific feature of JI solely. It
applies to any activities on climate change mitigation under the Convention).
As the JI project is to generate ERUs eligible for transfer, the designated
authorities in host and investing countries should approve the project as a JI
project.
The institutional organization of JI and the quality of project monitoring and
evaluation are crucial in attributing emissions reductions as well as in a project’s
chances for success. Collusion can happen, since all the participants have an
interest in declaring excessive emission reductions. The credibility of the
achieved reductions should be ensured, therefore, by qualitative verification.
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Following successful verification, the certification of the ERUs should take
place. Verification of achieved emission reductions can take place after the
project is already launched. Both parties, however, want to be sure that project
will achieve the anticipated results. Therefore, the special procedure –
validation – takes place immediately after project design phase.
However, JI project implementation needs to overcome some extra barriers
that were identified during the AIJ pilot phase and latest studies. In addition
to general investment project costs, the project developer is likely to incur
transaction costs. These costs, although not purely specific to JI project (as
implementation of any project carries such costs) can be too high that would
make JI implementation prohibitive (Dudek & Wiener, 1996).
As the issue is novel, such costs as on searching the suitable partner and
negotiating the deal can take extra money and time spending. The uncertainty of
the future market prices on ERUs as well as on particular baseline methodology
will increase the desire of the project partners to obtain extra insurance to guard
against the project failure. The obligatory need of strict monitoring perfor-
mance of the project means the need in extra technical expertise, equipment,
and operations, and thus increases expenses. Enforcement costs will arise if
monitoring reveals departures from the agreed project transaction. Therefore,
the transaction costs play a pivotal role in the vitality of a JI project. The widely
disseminated information on the available JI programs and possible partners
can lessen significantly such costs, and as experts (Dudek & Wiener, 1996) note
will inevitably come with the experience and time of market operation.
However, approval costs can be significant, and these can be lessened only if a
transparent and simple procedure of application, certification and approval is
designed by the governmental with the clear delegation of responsibilities to a
designated authority.
In the energy sector the scope of JI projects aimed at GHGs emissions
reduction covers a broad range:
(1) Efficiency improvement in energy generation based on fossil fuels, which
includes such measures as increasing the efficiency of power stations and
steam generators. By transferring know-how and expertise, it is possible
to ensure that technically feasible efficiency levels are also achieved in
practice. Emissions caused by the production and transport of fossil fuels
can be reduced as well. For example, since avoidable losses of 2–4.5%
occur during the extraction and transport of natural gas in Russia, this area
has great potential for Joint Implementation projects.
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(2) Conversion of energy generation to fuels, which emit less GHGs or none
at all, such as conversion from coal to gas or nuclear energy. In the long
run, renewable energy sources have a great potential for reducing GHGs
emissions.
(3) Reduction of energy consumption through more efficient manufacturing
processes. Innovations in manufacturing processes have great potential
for improving energy efficiency.
This range has an exception – no nuclear energy projects are allowed according
to the present rules under JI. It is anticipated that Joint Implementation brings
several benefits for all parties involved. First of all it allows meeting environ-
mental goal in mutually beneficial way. For a investing country it means
contribution to meeting the emissions reduction target at lower cost than through
national measures and creation of the new business opportunities for renew-
ables, efficiency technologies, management tools, products, and consultants. For
the host country JI means attraction of foreign investments, contribution to meet
the emissions reduction target at almost zero cost, creation of incentives to new
business opportunities for renewables, efficiency technologies, management
tools, products, consultants and contribution to enhancement of energy security
and independence by lessening demand for energy use.
2.2.2. Activities Implemented Jointly
A special pilot voluntary phase named Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ)
was established in 1994 at the first session of Conference of Parties (CoP 1) in
order to obtain experience in the Joint Implementation mechanism. The phase
was designed to be compatible with and supportive of national environment
and development priorities and strategies, contribute to cost-effectiveness in
achieving global benefits and to be conducted in a comprehensive manner
covering all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases. AIJ
phase is often considered as the learning-by-doing pilot program of Joint
Implementation (JI). Our interest in reviewing the AIJ pilot phase is the
common elements that both share: the common type of the structure being
project-based mechanisms (including the necessity to draw up the baseline
scenario) and necessity to satisfy the additionality requirement.
2.2.3. Host Countries Experience
AIJ projects are being implemented in over 35 countries around the globe. At
this stage the key investor countries in the AIJ pilot phase are the United States,
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Sweden, Netherlands, Australia, and Norway. Switzerland and Germany have
yet to report on a number of projects under development; however, they will also
likely be key investors in future projects under the evolving Joint Implementa-
tion and Clean Development Mechanism frameworks. The United States has
been a partner in the greatest number of AIJ projects, with 41 projects or 35% of
the total examined having or seeking the approval of the U.S. Initiative on Joint
Implementation (USIJI). Sweden has been another key investor in AIJ projects,
with 37 projects completed or underway, representing 32% of the total. The
Netherlands has pursued at least 17 AIJ projects, with several others in the
pipeline. The Netherlands maintains the primary geographical concentration of
its investments on Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States. Notably,
the Netherlands has been the largest investor in energy efficiency projects
concerning commercial-industrial applications.
2.2.4. Russian Experience in AIJ
The overview of Russian AIJ experience is complicated by mismatching of
data on officially reported and existing AIJ projects. Thus there are 9 projects
that are officially registered and posted on the UNFCCC website. This data
however can be not complete due to absence of strict UNFCCC’ requirement
of reporting these data as well as overall diversity of initiatives that triggered
AIJ projects in Russia. Some of implemented AIJ projects did not get the final
approval by the designated Russian focal point, i.e. Roshydromet, and thus
were not registered on the UNFCCC web site. Therefore, other sources points
out that there are 11 AIJ projects (Hodes, 2000) thus ranking Russia second
among countries with the largest concentration of projects completed or
underway after Latvia (17 projects).
According to the most comprehensive sources of information on Russian
AIJ/JI, the work done by Climate Strategies UK teaming international and
Russian experts, there are 29 developed projects 9 from which have been
either delayed or cancelled, 1 is at the stage of project design and for the 2
Russian-Dutch AIJ/JI initiatives there is no information. This leaves Russia
with experience in 18 completed AIJ/JI projects (Tangen et al., 2002).
The biggest share of projects are in the energy sector ranging from
conversion to the new fuel base (8); energy saving projects (9) and one aimed
at reducing of gas losses during transportation. It is worth of noting that two
of overall world five fugitive gas capture projects, with the United States
and the Netherlands are implemented in Russia. There are also one Russian-
EU and one Russian-USA reforestation projects. From 18 completed
176 F. LAROUI ET AL.
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Russian-European AIJ/JI projects 11 partnered Russia and Sweden, 6 were
developed under the Dutch government programme on international co-
operation with Central and Eastern region countries (PSO programme), and
1 Russia-Germany project aimed at reducing of CH4 losses during trans-
portation was triggered between Ruhrgas and Gazprom. This indicates the
strong European dimension of Russian AIJ experience.
On one hand both the size of Russia’s economy and its economic
performance in the mid-1990s likely have attributed to Russia’s relative
popularity for JI projects. Most Russian AIJ projects were launched between
1994 and 1997, a period when Russia’s stock market was booming and Russia
was one of the most popular emerging markets in the world. On the other
hand, there can be a skepticism drawn towards evaluating the phase as
successful because quite a big share (50%) of the officially approved and
registered as AIJ projects failed on implementation.
The authors see both: inactive and unclear Russian climate change policy
institutional basis and the poor investment policy to be responsible for this failure.
The first is notably referred both by Russian and foreign experts (Kokorin,
2000) to the weaknesses of the leading organization for Russian international
climate change policy (Rosgidromet). The last lies in the evidence that AIJ/JI
projects to be financed via promising direct foreign investment, in practice
appeared to tap traditional financing sources used in the region. These include
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development banks, foreign assistance, and in some cases, private finance.
Most of Russian AIJ project financing has come from public bodies in both
donor and host countries (Dutch Government, U.S. University, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency and others). Only one project, the gas
pipeline project with Ruhrgas and Gasprom, is commercial in the sense that it
has been financed by a donor country corporation.
This is not surprising given that emission reductions from AIJ/JI in these
countries have not provided a single investor – public or private – with any
return on investment to date. A large number of implemented projects are
investments that would pay for themselves even without reductions obtained.
This fact may be related to the lack of direct financial value of carbon
reductions at the point of time of AIJ implementation when anybody can say
what the actual value of such reduction on the market possibly can be. This
is also consistent with the estimates of low financial value of the carbon
reductions varying in time and depending on expectations of host countries
and development of international regulations under the Kyoto Protocol.
Thus, the optimistic estimates of 70–100 euros per ton at the end 1990s fall
drastically after the withdrawal of the USA from the Protocol to an
extremely low proposed price of 2–4 euros that World Bank Prototype
Carbon Fund (PCF) and the Dutch Emissions Reductions Procurement
Tender (EURPT) were ready to pay in the beginning of 2000s. Currently,
when more certainty on the Kyoto regulations exist and most due to the
adopted by the EU emissions trading scheme, the estimates came up. This
can be depicted best by the recently conducted trades, notably by one Central
European company that sold 90,000 tones of CO2 allowances at an average
price of 6 euros per ton (Point Carbon, 2003). The indicated fine of 40 euros
per ton in the period of 2005–2007 and 100 euros per ton in beyond 2007
under the EU directive on national Emissions Trading Scheme gives an
indirect indicator for the possible price of 1 ton of GHGs reductions.
However, still the market price for 1 ERUs can not be estimated at that level
of certainty, which can satisfy the investors to accept the risk of starting JI
projects.
Regarding the implementation of the Kyoto-based JI project the return of
investments and the impact that the value of emissions reduction credits will
have on it is crucial. Indeed very few investors want to pay for projects with no
returns in the foreseeable future. Another important lesson learned from AIJ
phase is that competitive on the GHGs market JI would be possible only if it is
commercially and investment attractive.
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2.2.5. Joint Implementation vs. Other Kyoto Protocol Mechanisms
The place of Joint Implementation in comparison with other flexibility mecha-
nisms of the Kyoto Protocol besides the regulations adopted in the framework of
the climate change policy negotiations can be assessed from different angels.
One can see the clear indication of the future competition between JI and
CDM projects as both are project-based mechanisms allowing Annex I countries
to account the resulted emissions reduction from their project investments
against their Kyoto targets. To this end the investor would most probably prefer
to invest in the project that generates emissions reductions with lower marginal
abatement costs and the one that can be practically implemented, i.e. having low
JI/CDM related investment risks, such as host-project national policy and
investment climate as well as institutional arrangements set up for JI/CDM
projects implementation. Consequently the competition between two mecha-
nisms will strongly depend on the demand side, i.e. the need of Annex I
countries in extra GHG reductions to comply with their target. The overview of
the possible demand side is conducted in consequent chapters. Indeed the threat
of loosing market for JI GHGs reductions for CDM is oftently cited in Russian
literature is the major indicator to the necessity of early start and promotion of JI
in Russia (Listvianov, 2003).
To define the cross-cutting issues shaping the place of Joint Implementation
versus International Emissions Trading (as set up by the Kyoto Protocol) in the
emerging carbon market is somewhat more difficult. One (Janssenn, 2000) can
see JI as the international production of emission permits involving
international investments whereas defining the IET as international trade in
emission permits by this earmarking the cross-line between two different
economic activities such as production and trade. Thus from an economic
perspective, emission reductions may be interpreted as intermediate inputs
required by regulated industries and companies for producing final goods.
Regulated companies could produce this intermediate input in-house or buy it
from another producer. Both activities, in-house production and purchase
from another producer, could be performed domestically or internationally.
Consequently, the company faces the situation where it has to decide to buy or
to produce the needed reductions which will depend on the marginal
abatement costs for GHG reductions on the side of production and transaction
costs on the side of purchase. The purchase of extra GHGs reductions from
entity to entity, as it is possible under JI regulations, will result in the intra-firm
transfer of reductions. Hence, transactions of emission reductions between the
JI project host and the JI project sponsor would figure as intra-firm trade.
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In the present context this implies, e.g., that the higher the specificity of
GHG abatements are, the higher is the probability that related international
transactions are performed through international production, i.e. JI, as op-
posed to international inter-firm trade, i.e. IET (Janssenn, 2000). Following
this line of argumentation one can question would international transactions
of GHG emission reductions resulting from different abatement project types
be carried out internally on the basis of international production, i.e. JI, or
through external markets, i.e. IET.
Another important issue is the effectiveness of JI as a mechanism for attracting
foreign financing for emission reductions. In reality host countries could invest in
e.g. energy efficiency on their own, without meeting all the necessary require-
ments set up under Kyoto such as searching for foreign partners, monitoring the
project and reporting to the international community on the results.
3. RUSSIA – EU JOINT IMPLEMENTATION
Independent of the sector of economy as an international investment, a JI
project combines particularities of two types of projects – projects aimed at
curbing emissions and those that are investment projects. The basic rationale
inherent in the concept of JI under the Protocol is the possibility of generating
emissions reductions that would be primarily cheaper than those achieved
domestically. Secondly, they should be accountable against a country emis-
sions reduction target under the Kyoto Protocol.
The following issues will shape the practice of the Russian-EU Joint
Implementation:
 JI enabling environment such as conformity of the host and investing
country with the requirements under the Kyoto Protocol,
 Supply versus demand for GHG reductions,
 Policy choice between mechanisms of host and investing countries.
3.1. JI Enabling Environment
3.1.1. European Union
The European Union ratified the Kyoto Protocol on 31 of May 2002
(UNFCCC, 2003) thus fully committing itself towards the Kyoto Protocol
requirements.
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The European Union always played an important and promotional role
in negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol. The EU has a strong ‘‘green’’
position on climate change. EU countries as a bubble under Burden
Sharing Agreement1 (BSA, see Box 2) have ambitious targets for the
reduction of greenhouse gases of 8% within 2008–2012 compared to their
1990 levels. This compares to an overall reduction of 14% (million tons
CO equivalents) by 2008 compared to a Business As Usual (BAU)
emissions forecast. The overall target has been distributed internally within
the EU, and Member States have been allocated specific emissions
reduction targets according to the ‘burden-sharing’ agreement of the Kyoto
Protocol.
1According to the Kyoto Protocol countries are allowed to fulfil their commitment jointly. They
can enter into agreement among themselves on how to achieve the joint commitment. The
process was called Regional Bubbles. Till present, this provision has been used successfully
only by the European Union, which adopted the 8% emission reduction target. EU member
countries entered a burden sharing agreement (BSA).
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Considering EU Member States in particular, it can be said that most of
them have been at the forefront of efforts to mitigate global climate change.
Some countries have been leaders in proposing targets for reducing GHG
emissions that are higher than those under the bubble (Germany – 25% in the
year 2005 and the UK – 20%). Among the EU countries that have strong
domestic climate change action programs are Germany, the Netherlands, UK
and Austria. They have introduced a wide range of domestic measures on the
reduction of GHG emissions.
However, studies indicate (Gummer & Moreland, 2000) that major factors
in the reduction of GHG emissions achieved so far have been the switch from
coal-powered to natural gas-fired electricity production (in UK) and reha-
bilitation policies in the former East Germany. Other measures, noticeably
energy efficiency incentives and high gasoline prices played a part. The
reduction is unlikely to continue at the same pace and meeting the Kyoto
target will be difficult.
The EU promotes the compulsory ‘‘50% reduction at home’’ policy thus
leaving the option for external actions, e.g. JI or CDM for generation of cheap
reduction credits and/or International Emissions Trading to buy reductions. JI
takes a serious attention in comparison with other Kyoto Mechanisms due the
desire of the EU to promote the environmental integrity of the Kyoto Protocol.
The CDM projects with EU countries are rare in comparison with other Annex
I investing countries and funds, such e.g. Japan or PCF because of the doubts
expressed on the sustainability of such projects. Even the Netherlands the
most active EU country in assessing and experiencing of all options available
decided not to conduct third CER-PT tender on purchase of CERs. After the
withdrawal of the USA the IET is also assessed with caution due to the
prominent issue of hot air, i.e. reductions of GHGs mostly in Russia and
Ukraine that are due to the economy collapse in 1990s and not to real
abatement activities. This leaves JI a promise, and indeed EU countries, as we
showed before, are active in acquiring experience in JI projects.
JI is also attractive because it is a perfect instrument for stimulating the
greening of the industry. In most industrialized countries JI incentives come
on top of already existing public support for green industry initiatives,
including schemes aimed at enhancing the export of environmental
technology. According to the World Bank Group, the volume of funds aimed
at governmental support for the development of environmental technology
programs is rather large. In Norway around 15–25 million euros have been
spent annually on such programs since 1990. The largest portion of these
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funds was targeted at environmental investments abroad. In Denmark the
Action Plan on Cleaner technologies (for the period 1993–1997) received
funds amounting to USD 60 million.
The same consideration is applicable to business-specific activities of
entities that have vast potential for investing in climate-friendly projects
abroad. These are mostly companies dealing with renewable energy tech-
nology and energy-efficient appliances. Petroleum companies engaged in
activities upstream and downstream in other countries are sensitive to
domestic regulations, but have a good potential of achieving these goals
abroad, also fall in the same category. The potential of the emerging market of
the EU green technologies is enormous. There is a clear desire to expand the
market and there is a growing trend to transfer these technologies abroad.
Therefore, it can be assumed that JI projects that will require the transfer of
green technology will be attractive for the European Community.
3.1.2. Russia
Russia signed but still did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, thus not meeting the
main requirement to start using any of the Kyoto Mechanisms, including JI.
Ratification of the Protocol by Russia is continuously the hot topic for last two
years. It gets its prominence firstly because Russia’ voice is vital in putting
the Protocol into force due to its share of world emissions. Secondly twice
Russian high officials declared Russia’ readiness to start the process of
ratification, i.e. Prime-minister Kasyanov’ speech at the Johannesburg World
Summit in September 2002 and the President Putin’ speech at the EU-Russia
Summit in May 2003.
The optimist can expect that the ratification package will be put to the
Russian Parliament, Duma, already this September and that ratification may
occur somewhere in-between the end of 2003–beginning 2004. Pessimist
however can note that the new elections into Duma started on 3 of September
2003 and no one can really assess the outcomes. Pragmatists would point that
everything that is related to ratification of the Protocol is dependant only on
the highest authorities will, and thus can be ‘‘yes-or-no’’ depending only on
what the leading grouping inside the Government will decide upon.
Why should Russia at all ratify the Kyoto Protocol? This is not a merely
rhetoric question, but an issue that is heavily disputed inside Russia.
Under the Kyoto Protocol the Russian Federation committed itself to the
stabilization of GHGs on the level of the year 1990. According to the second
National Communication the target level corresponds to 3039 Mt CO2
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equivalent (ICCC, 1998; FCCC SBI, 2000). Factual level of emissions for the
target year is not precise. For example cumulative emissions of basic
greenhouse gases the level of Russian emissions in 1990 corresponds to even
lower level of 2 648, 062 Mt of CO2-equivalent. Factually in the 1996 Russia
emitted 57.6% less then this level (i.e. 1122.441 Mt CO2 equivalent).
The range of official projected emissions (Table 3) indicates that Russia
will hardly exceed the Kyoto target before the first budget period, indicating
the possible surplus of GHG emissions in the middle of the first commitment
period up to 8%, i.e. 249 Mt CO2e. This possible surplus of emissions, oftently
referred to as hot air is being attributed to economic decline rather then to
result of abatement measures.2
Official reported projections differ from the latest estimates. Between 1990
and 2000, according to the Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy estimates,
carbon dioxide emissions declined by about 33% in the Russian energy sector.
There has been a slight rise in emissions over the last two years, however,
mainly due to greater domestic use of coal (7.6%), oil and oil products (8.3%).
Under the national Energy Strategy, approved by the Government of the
Russian Federation, this tendency will remain in the next ten years.
Accordingly, even with high development scenario without full scale
introduction of energy efficiency measures the volume of carbon dioxide
emissions by the Russian energy sector in 2010 will constitute only 80% of the
1990 base year level, approaching the level of 95% only by 2020 (Fig. 2).
This indicates that most probably Russia will have much bigger volume of
hot air, and thus potential AAUs to sell under IET then it was expected.
Moreover with full-scale implementation of energy efficiency measures this
volume could be expected to grow. The estimated level of emissions puts
Table 3. Official Scenarios of Total GHG Emissions in Russia, CO2 Equivalent (1990–2010).
Total equivalent
GHG emission,
Mt CO2e/yr
1990 (fact) 1994 (fact) 2000 2005 2010
Basic scenarioa 3 039 2 152 2 330 (77%) 2 710 (89%) 3 150 (104%)
Probable scenarioa 2 280 (75%) 2 570 (85%) 2 910 (96%)
Optimistic scenarioa 2 260 (74%) 2 520 (83%) 2 790 (92%)
aNote: rounded values and percent of the level of the year 1990.
Source: ICCC, 1998.
2For more information on the discussion see Michaelowa and Koch (1999).
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Russia in a position of one of the biggest suppliers of emissions reductions in
the emerging carbon market. The share of the emissions that belongs to the
energy sector gives it a strategic position among the other sectors of the
Russian economy. The reduction of emissions since 1990 was accompanied
by an even greater decrease of economic activity, which means that the
Russian energy-sector has become more energy-intensive during the last
decade.
Thus the strongest pro-ratification argument is based on the possible
economic benefits that Kyoto Protocol can bring to Russia via IET as extra
gain and via JI as the potential source of investments into energy sector.
Moreover, the official statement of the State Duma of the Russian Federation
of June 2002 states ‘‘. . . the confidence that the Russian Federation can fulfill
the Kyoto protocol’s GHG reduction commitments’’, so there are no direct
threat of joining the Protocol. Other argumentation stresses the overall
position of Russia on international political arena that can be hampered by the
fact of declaring promises but not fulfilling them. Pro-ratification activists also
point out that there is threat that in future Russia will have to join the countries
in their climate change mitigation efforts which then can become really
difficult in economic and technical terms because Russia will have to catch up
with already experienced counterparties.
The counter-ratification arguments are based mostly on doubts of
environmental and economic value of the Kyoto Protocol after the withdrawal
of the USA and non-inclusion of other biggest polluters such as India and
China into Annex I countries, i.e. countries that have quantified GHG
reduction targets. This vision is supported by the Deputy Minister of
Fig. 2. Scenarios of GHGs emissions 2000–2020.
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Economic development and trade of the Russian Federation, Mr. Tzikanov,
and by the head of the department of the Ministry of Energy of the Russian
Federation, Mr. Mastepanov (Listvianov, 2003).
The vision of absence of economic gains from IET due to low demand for
credits and prediction of low flow of JI projects due to JI related barriers are
also indicated as crucial of not jumping into obligations under the Kyoto first
commitment period. The last argument is also expressed by the key officials
(Listvianov, 2003) supported by the notion that after 2012 Russia most
probably will not have such a fortunate target (i.e. stabilization of GHGs
emissions on the level of 1990), and most probably will force itself in some
rigid compliance regime. The letter will hamper the economic growth that is
estimated as the first priority of Russia and is expressed in really impressive
forecasted tempo of development (MEDT, 2003).
In practice apart from the ratification of the Kyoto protocol the following
issues are necessary to make JI in Russia operational:
1. The clear institutional arrangements for approval and support of JI project
should exist with the clear designation of the organisation responsible for
such functions. Such arrangements should be designed in order to
minimize transaction costs as much as possible.
2. The set up of priorities and criteria for JI should be on place. This also will
help to correlate the JI practices with overall economic development
programs.
3. The promotion of JI projects development according to the criteria should
be on place. For this the dialog with regions, private entities and public
should be initiated. Other incentives for JI promotion such as potential tax
brakes can be beneficial.
4. Information on the domestic policies in JI should be made clear and
transparent for the potential investors.
5. Identification of the possibilities on place (such as setting up the entity
baseline) should be promoted.
This is a huge work that is yet to be done by Russia.
3.2. Demand Versus Supply of GHG Reductions
3.2.1. European Union
The EU political commitment to take action on GHG emissions appears to be
generally strong and supported by public opinion. Studies (Gummer &
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Moreland, 2000), however, indicate that despite strong domestic climate
change action plans in the member states the likelihood that the EU, as a
whole, will achieve its obligations by 2008/12 is low. Thus, the demand for
additional emissions reductions achieved through flexible mechanisms exists.
The demand for credits originating from a JI project is based on three
components:
 A country-specific emissions reduction target;
 The difference in costs of achieving reductions at home and those generated
abroad;
 The national policy put on place.
In the case of the EU, countries differ on their specific targets and marginal
abatement costs for achieving additional units of emissions reduction at home.
As the PRIMES3 model shows (Capros & Mantzos, 2000), if each EU country
meets the targets (the situation in which no domestic EU emissions trading
takes place), the marginal abatement costs ranges from 13.5 Eur/tCO2
(Germany) to 150.7 (the Netherlands), reaching an average of EUR 54.3 for
the EU. In total, EU will have to spend something like EUR 9 billion in order
to achieve their target in the first commitment period (2008–2010).
However, latest estimates PRIMES model and indicated limitations in
achieving reductions at home show that meeting the requirements of this
policy can be really a difficult and costly task. In order to decrease the costs of
achieving emissions reductions the EU will initiate the EU-wide domestic
emissions trading that has been set up to emerge in 2005. In this case, indeed,
the price of compliance drops by 24% and accounts to roughly 6.9 billion
euros.
The marginal abatement costs outside the trading regime range (Table 4)
from 31.1 euros per tCO2 (Austria) to 107.8 euros (the Netherlands). Since the
price of ERUs is less than the unit of reduction achieved at home, the country
is potentially interested in starting a project. For example, the Netherlands will
be interested in projects up to its ‘‘margin’’ 107.8 euros.
Several initial conclusions can be drawn from this scheme. Considering the
average price of one EUR indicated from the AIJ phase to be around 50 euros
the wide-scale application of JI with EU countries (apart from Netherlands
3PRIMES is a price-driven partial equilibrium model for energy-environment analysis within
the context of market-driven behavior. The short description is available at http://
www.worldbanlcorg/html/fpd/ernlpowerIEA/methods/tudprime.stm
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and Belgium) is questionable. This is especially valid if it is noted that the
price of 1 unit under the CDM can be potentially much lower. Therefore, only
projects that generate ERUs at a price lower than EUR 30 have a probability
have finding an investing EU country. The higher the price, the more value
would be put by the home country on the factors that will determine the
success of the investment project (these include the investment climate of the
host country and risks associated with investments in a particular project
activity). In brackets the marginal abatement costs for generating emissions
reduction at home in Euro/tCO2 is shown for every country.
3.2.2. Russia
The precise estimates of possible supply of Russian emissions reduction
credits is uncertain due to the lack of data on-hand that are limited to outdated
and not full second National Communication and assumptions on projects of
emissions drawn by various experts. This especially is true regarding the
AAUs supply under IET. The evaluation of how much Russia will be able to
supply to the market under IET thus cannot be precise and varies significantly
from one estimate to another depending on assumptions on the pace and
character of economic development in Russia. Energy efficiency and saving
can also give a significant input on the level of emissions. According to the
Table 4. Countries – Potential Partners for JI Depending on the Range of Costs for Generating 1
ERU.
20–30 Euro/tCO2 30–45 Euro/tCO2 45–60 Euro/tCO2 60–100 Euro/tCO2
Austria (31.1) Belgium (67.6 Euro/tCO2) Belgium (67.6) Netherlands (107.8)
France (26.7) Netherlands (107.8) Netherlands (107.8)
Germany (31.6) Ireland (41)
Belgium (67.6) Finland (40.4)
Netherlands (107.8) Greece (34.2)
Ireland (41) Portugal (34.3)
Finland (40.4) Spain (32.5)
Greece (34.2) Sweden (36.2)
Portugal (34.3) UK (32.7)
Spain (32.5) Italy (33.3)
Sweden (36.2)
UK (32.7)
Italy (33.3)
Note: In brackets the marginal abatement costs for generating emission reduction at home in
Euro/tCO2 is shown for every country.
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Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (MEDT) of the Russian
Federation the potential supply of GHGs in the form of AAUs is estimated as 3
billion tons annually. The potential overall international demand is estimated
by MEDT as of 300 million tons annually (Listvianov, 2003).
Regarding Joint Implementation it is possible to draw some assumption on the
bases of official Russian energy studies and on the experience of the AIJ phase.
The Russian Energy Strategy (for the period up 2020) assumes that as much as
20% of energy-saving potential, equivalent to 70 to 85 million tons (carbon
equivalent) per year can be achieved at a cost of euros 15 per ton even with current
domestic prices for fuel and energy resources. The highest-cost measures, at more
than euros 60 per tone, constitute approximately 15% of the energy-saving
potential. Realization of the remaining portion requires target investments that
are 10–30% lower than respective capital inputs for expansion of the fuel and
energy sector production base. This means that projects on energy saving and
energy efficiency will be more attractive. The Russian Energy Ministry esti-
mates that energy-saving measures used intensively will help reduce energy
consumption by 360 to 430 million tons of coal equivalent per year. About one-
third of the energy-saving potential is concentrated in the fuel and energy sector
industries; the remaining two-thirds in other branches of the economy.
Basing on available information (Tangen et al., 2002) the following break
down of costs of one ton CO2 reduction for completed Russian AIJ projects
can be drawn:
 For energy efficiency projects ranging from 3.5 euros (3.1 USD $) for
modelling and optimization of grid operation of the gas transportation
system to 46 euros (45.49 USD $) for infection hospital energy efficiency
 Fuel switch projects with the lowest 3.7 euros (3.68 USD $) for district
heating project and the maximum of 34.5 euros (34.14 USD $) for wood
processing fuel switch project.
 Russian-Dutch Fugitive gas capture project on sanitary landfilling with
energy recovery estimates around 7 euros (6.82 USD $) per ton of CO2.
If to take into account that there is a big room for similar projects in Russia one
of the conclusions can be drawn that Russian energy JI projects in theory can
fit well in the boundaries of 5–50 euros per ton.
3.3.3. Price Setting
The price setting is very uncertain. After the withdrawal of the USA, the
emerging carbon market looses the potential biggest buyer. According to some
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estimates the supply side of emission credits can outweighed the demand and
therefore the potential carbon price will drop significantly in case of full hot
air trading. The expected price is an important criteria in decision making on
JI and ET as well as for project developers and investors. However, future
price setting n the carbon market is very difficult to predict.
There are also some assumptions that the price will not be entirely
‘‘equilibrium’’ driven. It is anticipated that the international carbon price will
be a political construct reflecting willingness to pay, market power, and
management approaches (i.e. Russian initiative on Green Investment
Scheme). Therefore the plausible level on this basis could be in the range
$20–50 t/C (or 5–15 euros/tCO2), and possibly differentiated depending on the
mechanisms used (Grubb, 2001).
In line with the US withdrawal and unrestricted trading under the IET rules,
the issue of hot air (also referring to Ukraine) plays an important role in a)
establishment of possible carbon price and b) influencing on the environ-
mental effectiveness from IET employment. As studies indicate, it is in
Russia’s (and Ukraine) interest to exercise market power by curtailing and
banking supply ranging from 50 to 80%. (Fig. 3).
 
 
Fig. 3. Net Export Revenues for permit supply regions. Source: Kypreos et al., 2002.
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This policy would bring quite important results: improvement of
environmental effectiveness of the policy; increase financial revenues for
Economies in transition (EIT) and non-Annex I countries, and increases
Annex I abatement costs (Table 5). Other models, such as POLES, also show
similar conclusions.
3.3. Policy Choice of Mechanisms of Host and Investing
Countries
The agreed in Marrakech rules identify that once an Annex I country is
eligible under the Kyoto Protocol requirements it can build its strategy on
utilization of the Kyoto Mechanisms, putting different weight on either of the
mechanisms depending on national priorities and anticipated benefits from the
Mechanisms.
For the Annex I countries that have to reduce their GHG emission levels,
i.e. for the EU, the major factors determining this strategy will be the price
factor – where is cheaper to obtain reductions (at home, by JI, IET or CDM)
and the overall development trend aimed on implementation of sustainable,
environmentally friendly policies.
For Russia as one of the major hosts for JI it will be the maximization of
profits gained via the Kyoto Mechanisms, international policy making, ability
to meet the UNFCCC requirements and ability to create institutional
structures and enabling instruments for the Kyoto Mechanisms.
3.3.1. European Union: Emissions Trading Scheme
The European Union is a notable promoter of Climate Change policies. The
position regarding the Kyoto Mechanisms is aimed on securing environmental
integrity of the Protocol. A big number of studies and different activities were
conducted on the EU level with employment of different Expert Groups, as
well as on the separate level of Member States. The literature on EU climate
change policies is vast,4 and it can be stated that the EU policy in respect of co-
operation on the implementation of the Kyoto Mechanisms has a guiding
character. It is recognized that Member States shall take existing national and
EC requirements into consideration when they adopt national measures for the
implementation of JI.
4For better understanding and more background on the issue the reader is advised to check the
European Commission web-site. URL: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/environment/climate
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In analyzing the policy choice of the Mechanisms for European
Community it is important to bare in mind that there is a common policy of
the EU towards Kyoto that is expressed in their Burden Sharing Agreement
(BSA), the environmental integrity: 50% at home and 50% abroad rule
agreement, and emerging EU wide emissions trading scheme (ETS). However
there is also a policy of EU Member-States that, although has to be in line with
common EU policy, has a room for variations, especially in regard of inclusion
of external actions such as Joint Implementation in their national policies.
Some Member States, e.g. Germany are stricter in their domestic policies then
others. Others, e.g. the Netherlands will employ all possible internal and
external actions with significant weight of JI and CDM credits to comply with
its target. The most important to date policy, however, is the emerging EU
ETS.
The Common Position on establishment of the EU domestic emissions
trading scheme was approved on 18th of March 2003. The system to start from
2005 onward limits carbon dioxide emissions from a broad range of industries,
such as power generation, and places them within a regulatory framework.
The large carbon dioxide emitters will be allocated allowances on an annual
basis through national allocation plans and required to matchkeep their
emissions with their holdings of in the limits set by the allowances. If they
reduce emissions to a level below their limits, they can sell the excess
allowances to other companies or keep them for future use. Vice versa,
companies that exceed their limits can invest in abatement technology or buy
allowances on the market to match their emissions, whichever is the cheaper.
In this way, it is expected that the EU scheme will allow emissions reductions
to take place at minimum cost to the economy.
Later in July the special provision on linkage of Kyoto Protocol project-
based mechanisms (i.e. JI and CDM) was reached. In the latter documents the
inclusion of Russian JI starting from 2008 is particularly highlighted. The
projects need to result in real, measurable and long-term climate change
benefits, which will be verified according to the Kyoto Protocol. Based on
these verifications, Member States will be free to convert such credits into
allowances under the EU emissions trading scheme so that they can be traded
within the scheme. The proposal is build to enable the Commission to ensure
that the EU’s emission targets will not exclusively be met by cutting emissions
through projects. It envisages the triggering of a review once JI and CDM
project credits equivalent to 6% of the total quantity of allowances issued for
the 2008–2012 trading period enter the emissions trading scheme. If triggered,
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this review will consider placing a limit on the credits that can be converted
during the remainder of the trading period. The introduction of such a
quantitative limit would be done through the committee carrying out tasks in
relation to the EU’s emissions trading scheme, where the Member States are
represented.
The proposal excludes nuclear projects in line with the Kyoto Protocol’s
rules and ‘‘carbon sinks.’’ Carbon sinks – forests to soak up CO2 – have been a
contentious issue at international level because they do not bring technology
transfer, they are inherently temporary and reversible, and uncertainty remains
about the effects of emission removal by carbon sinks. International
negotiations on what types of forestry projects might be acceptable to
governments have not yet been completed.
The emerging EU ETS is very interesting as it intends to bridge, alike the
Kyoto Protocol, two different frameworks: community cap and trade of direct
emissions system (ex-ante allocation) and the Kyoto protocol projects, i.e.
baseline and credit system (ex-post verification). The interest lies in dif-
ferences inherited by those two systems, such as different regulatory context
and institutions involved, different timing and different level of certainty
ranging from ratification of Kyoto Protocol to implementation of JI/CDM.
This exercise, although limited to 2005–2007 will give and indispensable
experience for the EU in Kyoto Protocol mechanisms and also for JI/CDM
host countries in practicing the full range of situations that are very likely to
occur in the future when the carbon market will start working in 2008.
3.3.2. Russia: Green Investment Scheme
In 2001 Russia introduced the concept of Green Investment Scheme (GIS) to
the international agenda. The outline of the scheme is presented in the work of
Tangen et al. (2002).
The emerging GIS is a middle way between IET and JI, as it combines the
sale of allowances with investment in actual energy efficiency projects. The
design of the scheme is not fully developed yet. Therefore, there is no clarity
yet, which actors (government agencies, private sector companies or both)
would be engaged under this scheme. One of the key provisions inherented in
the concept is possible forward sales of AAUs before Russia is fully eligible
for IET and investment of achieved revenues to energy saving and other
projects. In light of possible problems of Russia in meeting eligibility criteria
for participation in IET and the GIS to present is one of the most
comprehensive policy option proposed by Russian team.
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The broad criteria under that the scheme has to meet are as follows:
– Bring real investments in Russian energy efficiency,
– Provides emission cuts with legitimacy in context of the climate regime,
– Has a level of transaction costs and risks associated with it that makes it
competitive with other alternatives for quota transfer.
It is expected that the scheme will operate under centralized control over the
trades in order to avoid over selling and other risks that will happen in
uncoordinated market. Due to the concept the scheme should present clear
investment instrument into projects. The treatment of the projects is pro-
posed under the two approaches: program and project approach that are
expected to work in tandem. The two approaches take their rational on the
orientation of the scheme on two different partners: the EU and Japan. Thus
the program approach will manage small projects on the line with less strict
verification procedures with no link between the buyer of Russian AAUs
and the actual projects in Russia, satisfying the Japanese criteria for
projects. The project approach understands that a receiver of AAUs is
directly involved in project development. Projects under such approach can
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be expected to be big. The approach also targets the possible EU interest in
GIS.
So far the only one conclusion that can drawn about the scheme is that
being the most comprehensive Kyoto mechanisms policy on place the scheme
even in its design has a very complex nature and is yet not officially approved
as the national programme or strategy.
3.4. EU-Russia Partnership: Something Else in Common?
The EU and Russia have common interests in both climate and energy issues;
often these interests are related to each other.
Both Russia and the EU are big players in the climate field and are able to
strongly influence the rules of the forthcoming climate regime. Russia and the
European Union are natural partners in the energy sector. 45% of Russian
energy exports are directed to the EU. 53% of Russian oil exports (crude and
products) or 181 million tons of oil equivalent (toe) went to the EU in 1999.
Some 63% (130 billion cubic meters (Bcm)) of Russia’s natural gas exports
of 205 Bcm were delivered to European countries in the year 2000, with
contractual requirements to increase deliveries to around 200 Bcm by the year
2008. Approximately 56% (73 Bern) of the natural gas exported to Europe in
2000 was delivered to the EU. The energy sector in Russia represents a major
opportunity both for foreign investment and for export revenues. The need for
new capital in the sector has been estimated at between $460 and $600 billion
up to the year 2020 (Mastepanov, 2001).
The Russian-European Energy Partnership initiative by presidents Prodi
and Putin was introduced in October 2000 in order to raise all the issues of
common interest related to the energy sector. The main idea was to develop
the existing energy dialogue and secure the long-term energy supply and
demand. A high-level joint working group on energy was established in order
to outline a program to promote EU imports of Russian gas, oil and electricity.
The Kyoto Protocol has an important place in the Energy Dialog (Korppoo
et al., 2001).
There seems to be the match of interests. Russia needs investments in
energy-saving and energy efficiency. The EU should secure an uninterrupted
and safe supply from Russia with a firm commitment for the implementa-
tion of the Kyoto Protocol. JI in the energy sector can help achieve both goals.
JI between Russia and EU is economically feasible. In EU countries there is
a demand for credits generated by JI projects, strong policy commitment
and domestic incentives for private entities in place. In Russia there is a
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willingness to participate, a vast reduction potential and all the preconditions
necessary for improving the investment climate.
Other aspect is the EU-Russian environmental cooperation that is declared
to be strengthened by the Commissioner M. Wallstrom during Troika visit5 to
Russia in March 2003. She particularly stressed that for the European Union,
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol is no longer solely an issue of environmental
policy. It is part of our broader bilateral agenda with Russia (Wallstrome,
2003). The agenda is strongly linked to the strategy for a new neighborhood
policy of an enlarged European Union, including with Russia. It builds on the
existing EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and aims at further
strengthening relations in all areas, including the environment.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
It is anticipated that Joint Implementation brings several benefits for all parties
involved. First of all it allows meeting environmental goal in mutually
beneficial way. For an investing country it means contribution to meeting the
emissions reduction target at lower cost than through national measures and
creation of the new business opportunities for renewables, efficiency tech-
nologies, management tools, products, and consultants. For the host country JI
means attraction of foreign investments, contribution to meet the emissions
reduction target at almost zero cost, creation of incentives to new business
opportunities for renewables, efficiency technologies, management tools,
products, consultants and contribution to enhancement of energy security and
independence by lessening demand for energy use.
The biggest barrier seen for JI between the EU and Russia is the fact that
there is no clarity on ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by Russia and no clear
designation of which organization is responsible for implementing the Kyoto
Mechanisms. In particular, a clear traceable procedure with respect to JI
projects (that would include certification, verification and approval) with a
clear division of the responsibilities between agencies is still lacking.
One can speak of matching interests between Russia and EU. Russia needs
investments in energy-saving and energy efficiency. The EU should secure an
5Troika refers to the EU Delegation represented by the Greek Environment Minister Vassou
Papandreou as President-in-office of the EU Environment Council, European Environment
Commissioner Margot Wallstro¨m and Environment Minister Altero Matteoli of Italy.
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uninterrupted and safe energy carriers supply from Russia with a firm
commitment for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. JI in the energy
sector can help achieve both goals. JI between Russia and EU is economically
feasible. In EU countries there is a demand for credits generated by JI projects,
strong policy commitment and domestic incentives for private entities in
place. In Russia there is a willingness to participate, a vast reduction potential
and all the preconditions necessary for improving the investment climate. The
latest initiative on the Green investment scheme shows promising signs that
Russia is capable to come up with own national strategy that would tackle
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms.
The emerging EU emissions trading scheme intends to bridge, alike the
Kyoto Protocol, two different frameworks: community cap and trade of direct
emissions system (ex-ante allocation) and the Kyoto protocol projects, i.e.
baseline and credit system (ex-post verification). The interest lies in dif-
ferences inherited by those two systems, such as different regulatory context
and institutions involved, different timing and different level of certainty
ranging from ratification of Kyoto Protocol to implementation of JI/CDM.
This exercise, although limited to 2005–2007 will give an indispensable
experience for the EU in Kyoto Protocol mechanisms and also for JI/CDM
host countries in practicing the full range of situations that are very likely to
occur in the future when the carbon market will start working in 2008. For
Russia the scheme has a special relevance as it allows introducing real JI
projects into the scheme.
An important issue is the effectiveness of JI as a mechanism for attracting
foreign financing for emission reductions. In reality host countries could
invest in e.g. energy efficiency on their own, without meeting all the necessary
requirements set up under Kyoto such as searching for foreign partners,
monitoring the project and reporting to the international community on the
results. This concern can be well smoothened by the latest activity of Russian
energy and oil majors (RAO UES Rossii – biggest monopolist in electricity
generation, UKOS – oil and gas major and Gasprom – gas monopolist) that
plan to conduct corporate inventories and support the newly established
Carbon Partnership Agreement that also includes the aluminum giants. The
RAO UES Rossii’ Carbon Fund that already has the portfolio of more then 300
GHG abatement projects in energy sector just needs the green light of Russian
ratification to start its business activities.
Potential of Russia-EU JI projects is substantial as from the point of view of
Russian technical and energy saving potential and mitigation costs as Russian
198 F. LAROUI ET AL.
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
7:
57
 4
 A
pr
il
 2
01
1
energy JI projects in theory can fit well in the boundaries of 5–50 euros per
ton – the range which is acceptable by most of EU countries. The experienced
learned by the EU and Russian organizations and structures in AIJ phase and
overall enhanced co-operation between EU and Russia can be very supportive
in furthering JI.
The issue of high uncertainty that hampers all the opportunities for EU-
Russia JI is pending ratification of the Protocol by Russia. Being optimists we
consider that this barrier will be overcome in the nearest future.
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